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IN THE SUPREME COunT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEERY AND HILTON TRAVEL 
SERVICES, INC., 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL 
AIRWAYS, INC., 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 15219 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent and cross-appellant, Capitol International Airways, 
Inc. (Capitol), is a charter airline. Appellant, DeEry and Hilton Travel 
Services, Inc. (DeEry) is a travel agent. This case arose when Capitol 
refused to fly a charter aircraft for DeEry due to the lack of an enforce-
able contract and DeEry's non-performance of conditions precedent to 
the contract. DeEry sued Capitol for breach of contract and unjust 
discrimination against DeEry. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COunT 
Following a jury trial and pursuant to the special written inter-
~ccgatories submitted to the jury, the court, The Honorable Maurice 
ddrd:ng presiding, entered JUdgment for DeEry and against Capitol 
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in the sum of $8, 170. 00 plus interest. Thereafter the court denied 
the motions of the respective parties for directed verdicts in their favor 
and for a new trial and additur. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Capitol seeks an order from this court directing the trial court 
to enter a directed verdict in favor of Capitol, holding there was no 
contract. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is the intention of respondent and cross-appellant, Capitol, to 
supply the court here with an overview of the facts and make reference to 
specific facts within the arguments. Appellant, DeEry, is a travel agem 
involved in the sale of travel, transportation and vacation services to the 
general public, with its principal place of business in the'State of Utah. 
Capitol is a supplemental air carrier, sometimes known as a charter 
airlbe, with its principal place of business in the State of Tennessee. 
There is no dispute that Capitol and DeEry, prior to November c: 
1973, engaged in numerous transactions whereby DeEry would charter 
the aircraft of Capitol for specific flights flown from specific points aroV-
the world. 
In early November, 1973, DeEry contacted representatives of 
Capitol to inquire concerning the price and arrangements which could be., 
to fly three flights, which were subsequently assigned the numbers of c),, 
485 and 486. Pursuant to this inquiry, lning H. ''Buck" l\lansfield, a 
representative of Capitol, under co,·er rlf his letter of ::\o•:ember ~~. ' 
-2-
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sent three contract forms to DeEry for the above-mentioned flights. With 
his letter of November 30, 1973, DeEry returned the contract forms for 
Flight 485, having signed them on the designated line. Thereafter an 
addendum to all contracts was sent to all customers of Capitol providing 
for a 15 percent increase in prices, which was approved by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, due to the Arab oil embargo which caused a sharp 
increase in fuel prices. DeEry executed an addendum for earlier flights 
he had contracted for but did not return an addendum for Flight 485. Also, 
the addendum submitted by DeEry contained a specific reservation of rights 
to challenge the price increase. 
On December 20, 1973, Buck Mansfield, the regional vice-president 
for Capitol, wrote to Carl Topham, counsel for Capitol. This letter was 
designed to acquaint legal counsel with information relating to litigation 
that had been instituted by DeEry against Capitol on other transactions 
involving the parties, which included a challenge as to the legality of the 
above-mentioned price increases. In response to this letter, Topham 
replied to lvlansfield in his letter of January 24, expressing concern over 
DeEry's non-compliance with CAB regulations. Several letters from 
DeEry followed, asking Capitol to sign the contracts for Flight 485. 
Capitol never did sign he contracts or otherwise enter into an agreement 
as to that particular flight with DeEry. 
In July of 1974, DeEry brought a declaratory action for a 
declaration of rights under the alleged contract resulting in the instant 
~chon for damages being brought by DeEry. Notwithstanding the fact 
-3-
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that DeEry acknowledged contract problems, it was not until November 
2, 1974, 20 days before the planned departure, that DeEry sent a letter 
to Pan American Airlines to see if they would be willing to charter an 
airplane for the tour. On November 8, 1974, Pan Am rejected the idea 
and refused to fly a plane for DeEry. Thereafter DeEry purchased indhc 
tickets on Air Canada and took the tour particpants to Canada for departuc' 
The total price of these individual tickets far exceeded the cost of a 
charter tour flight. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN DEERY AND CAPITOL 
DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF A CONTRACT FOR 
THE CHARTER OF FLIGHT 485. 
A. Capitol is restricted in its acceptance powers of offers to contract 
by the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 
The first question this court must decide is whether a contract 
form sent by a supplemental air carrier to a tour operator with a cover 
letter explaining contingencies which must be satisfied in order to resuh 
in a binding contract may be construed as an absolute and binding offer 
by the air carrier. By letter of November 27, 1973, DeEry received 
contract forms referred to as such in the cover letter from Capitol. 
(Tr. Day 2, p. 44). It was also pointed out to DeEry in that same cover 
letter that his Civil Aeronautics Board filing must be received immedi111 
or the 11ights would be cancelled. (Tr. Day 2, p. 108). It was wah 
reason that Mr. Mansfield, the representati'.e for Capitol, put tlneo 
warning for DeEry into the cover letter. The ·.·ery first conditlon oi 
-,\-
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contract itself is: 
1. This contract is subject to the terms, conditions, 
rules, regulations, rates and charges in United States 
dollars, contained in applicable tariffs of the carrier on 
file with the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United 
States in effect on the date of the initial flight departure; 
to the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 
as amended; to the terms, conditions, limitations, rules 
and regulations set forth in applicable governmental 
laws or regulations; and to such U.S. and foreign 
governmental or other approval as may be required. 
The relevant and applicable regulations of the CAB which deal 
with the formation of such charter contracts are found in Section 208. 31A and 
B, which states as follows: 
208. 31A. Written agreements with ticket agents. Each 
agreement between a supplemental air carrier and any 
ticket or cargo agent shall be reduced to writing and 
signed by all parties thereto, if it relates to any of the 
following subjects: 
(a) The furnishings of persons or property for 
transportation; 
(b) The arranging for flights for the accommodation 
of persons or property; 
(c) The solicitation or generation of passenger 
or cargo traffic to be transported; 
(d) The charter or lease of aircraft. 
208. 31B. Written contract with charterers. 
(a) Every agreement to perform a charter trip, 
except charters for the Department of Defense, shall 
be in writing and signed by an authorized representative 
of the supplemental air carrier and the charterer prior 
to operation of the charter flight; provided that where 
execution of a contract prior to commencement of flight 
is impracticable because the charter has been arranged 
on short notice, compliance with the provision hereof 
shall be effected within seven (7) days after commencement 
-5-
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of the flight. The written agreement shall include 
without limitation: 
( 1) Date and place of execution of the contract 
or agreement; 
(2) Signature, printed or typed, name of each 
signatory, and official provision of each; 
(3) Dates of flights and points involved; 
(4) Type and capacity of aircraft; number of 
passenger seats available or pounds of cargo capacity; 
and 
(5) Rates, fares, and charges applicable to 
the charter trip, including the charter price, live and ferry 
mileage charges, and layover and other non-flight charges. 
(6) The name and address of either the surety 
whose bond secures advance charter payments received 
by the carrier or of the carrier's depository bank to 
which checks or money orders for advance charter pay-
ments are to be made payable, as escrow holder pending 
completion of the charter trip; and 
(7) A statement that unless the charterer files 
a claim with the carrier, or, if he is unavailable, with 
the surety within sixty (60) days after the cancellation 
of a charter trip with respect to which the charterer's 
advance payments are secured by the bond, the surety 
shall be released from all liability under the bond to such 
charterer for such charter trip. 
(b) No term or condition of the charter contract 
shall on its face be inconsistent with any provision of 
the carrier's published tariff. 
For the type of student charter which DeEry proposed to !1y, a 
joint filing between the air carrier and the tour operator must be pro•.c,,i, 
to the C.\B under Regulation 378. 10. 
In light of these regulations req·~iring the signJ.turc:s of bot:c 
parties in writing, on the contract, and requinng a .io;.;ct filing, bec··.;:·c 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this contract could become binding upon both parties, not only was DeEry 
required to sign the contract form, but also Capitol. Capitol, as a 
supplemental air carrier, is involved in an industry which may be more 
highly regulated by the federal government than any other. They were 
aware of the CAB regulations when negotiating with DeEry and could not 
violate those provisions. Therefore, the entire contract, as may be seen 
above, is contingent upon satisfying the conditions in the CAB regulations 
and in the contract. In this matter, Capitol reserved the right to refuse 
to contract with anyone not in compliance with the CAB regulations. 
Although no cases directly on point have been found, a similar 
fact situation was involved in North Denver Bank v. Bell, 528 P. 2d 413 
(Colo. 1974). In this case an agreement was entered into by the parties 
whereby a loan commitment was made for a period of 18 months. By way of 
letters, seven conditions were stipulated which were to be met or agreed 
tu, either prior to or simultaneous to the closing of a loan. The court held 
that it was clear from the language of the commitment letter that the list 
of requirements was intended to be conditions precedent to the other party's 
obligation to perform. The court stated: 
Fairways did not offer to provide the signatures of the 
owners of the construction company as principals on 
the note to be executed at the closing and should not 
provide ire lien protection required by the commitment 
letter. Failure to fulfill any one of the conditions would 
have been sufficient grounds for Capital Federal's 
refusal to make the loan. 528 P. 2d at 414. 
It ts the law in Utah that an unconditional acceptance of an offer 
""rms a binding contract. R. J. Daum Construction Co. v. Childs, 122 Utah 
-7-
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194, 247 P. 2d 817 (1952). Because Capitol is governed by the CAB and, 
therefore, conditions its acceptance of contracts upon compliance with c_ 
regulations, there was no unconditional acceptance to form a binding cue: 
with DeEry. Capitol refused to sign the contract due to the lack of fuHr:> 
ment of the conditions cited above, and rightly so, in order to a void 
violation of the CAB regulations. 
B. DeEry was aware of the contract conditions and the CAB regulations 
but did not comply. 
The importance of the proposed filing for student tour charters 
cannot be over-emphasized. The filing is a joint filing, as required by 
CAB Regulation 378. 10, which provides as follows: 
Procedure. (a) No inclusive tour or series of tours 
shall be operated, nor shall any tour operator or 
foreign tour operator sell, or offer to sell, or 
solicit persons to participate in, or otherwise 
advertise such tour or tours, or receive any money 
from any prospective participant in connection there-
with, until at least fifteen days after he and the direct 
air carrier have jointly filed with the Board (Supple-
mentary Services Division, Bureau of Operating 
Rights), in duplicate a tour prospectus, satisfying 
the requirements of Section 378. 13. [Emphasis added] 
Section 378. 13 of the CAB regulations details the information ar.c 
materials which comprise the tour prospectus: 
The prospectus shall be filed in duplicate and shall 
include two copies of the following: The charter 
contract, the contract between the tour operator or 
foreign tour operator and tour participants, the tour 
operator's ... surety bond ... , and, where 
applicable, two copies of the depository agreement 
with a bank ... 
Other requirerEents set forth are as :·ollo'.'IS: The tour uptr2'• , 
name and address; the proposed date and time oi each r1Ight: the r:.pc, 
-8-
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number and capacity of aircrafts; the tour itinerary (including hotel names 
and sightseeing arrangements); the tour price per passenger, the number 
of tour participants; the aircraft charter price; the individually ticketed 
air fare; and samples of the tour operator's proposed solicitation materials . 
. c\11 such materials must state the direct air carrier's name and it should be 
noted that the documents and information which make up the tour prospectus 
are readily available to the tour operator from his own records or other-
wise. 
There can be no doubt that DeEry acknowledged the conditions in 
the contract and the CAB regulations. In his reply letter to Buck Mansfield 
of November 30, 1973, DeEry states: "I am now printing the solicitation 
material for the student flights, which I will send to you in the next few 
days, as well as the first draft of the ITC filing. " (Exhibit 4- P, Tr. Day 
1, p. 48). 
DeEry does not contend that Capitol prevented him from making this 
mandatory filing. Even if Capitol's "failure" to execute the charter 
agreement was improper and prevented filing of the assigned charter 
contract, DeEry still could have substantially complied with Section 
378. 13. DeEry made no attempt to do so. 
As has already been pointed out in the CAB regulations, DeEry 
cannot contend that it was not bound by the regulations, as a tour operator 
is specifically labeled as an indirect air carrier. Also, no contention 
can be made that Capitol is not governed by said regulations. One tour 
uperatur has been prosecuted for non-compliance with the same regulations 
-9-
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in the Federal District Court for the District of Utah. CAB v. Internatw 
··:.:.1 
Exchange School, Dist. of Utah, 1973, 357 F. Supp. 819. For an analogo,,•' 
CAB proceedin~ see In Re Matterhorn Travel Service, Inc., CAB Ordt'_ 
Cease and Desist, (May 1975, Order 75-5-3), Docket 27797. In the 
Matterhorn enforcement proceeding, the CAB found that Matterhorn was 
an inclusive tour operator and thereby an indirect air carrier under 
Section 101. 3 of the Federal Aviation Act (49 USC, Section 1301, sub 3). 
This subjected Matterhorn to the provisions of Part 378 of the regulations, 
prohibiting a tour operator from selling, soliciting or advertising a tour:. 
15 days after a satisfactory tour prospectus has been filed. The CAB impcs· 
a civil penalty of $1, 000. 00 against Matterhorn in this proceeding. In si:;~ 
I 
DeEry knew of the conditions of the contract and of the CAB regulations;: 1 
did not perform the conditions and openly violated the regulations. 
C. As a matter of law, it was not the intent of the parties to form a 
binding contract in this instance. 
It doesn't matter that the form of a piece of paper is called a 
''contract", the IP verning consideration in determining the existence 
of such an instrument is always the intent of the parties. It is the 
contention of Capitol that upon the evidence presented to the court below, 
Capitol was entitled to a verdict as a matter of law that the parties had .. : 
intention of being bound by the written agreement signed by DeEry. 
A brief sketch of the parties' correspondence, which was exhibi~' 
to the jury, will reveal to the court the obvious intent and understa!'d;:;£ 
of the parties. On l'lovember 8, 1973, DeEry wrote to Buck :\Iansfield 
-10-
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requesting "charter bids" for two flights. (Exhibit 1- P). This was followed 
by a telephone call from DeEry's secretary requesting the flights and price 
information. (Tr. Day 1, p. 42, 43). 
The response to DeEry's request was Capitol's letter of November 
27, 1973. (Exhibit 2-P). Contract forms were enclosed therein for the desired 
flights, with instructions in the cover letter that the forms must be returned 
unmediately, the price was subject to increase, and the ITC filing must 
be received by Capitol immediately or the flights would be cancelled. There 
is no question that DeEry returned the forms signed, but Capitol never 
signed as accepting the contract. The contract form itself (Exhibit 3-P), 
reveals an obvious intent on the part of Capitol to reserve the power to 
accept. At the time the forms were sent to DeEry, no signature was placed 
in the appropriate space as "accepted for Capitol". If they had ir.tended to 
be bound by this contract, it seems that they would have signed it ahead of 
time. 
As a matter of law, DeEry knew of the conditions that Capitol had 
placed on the contract forms and the cover letter. Upon reading DeEry's 
reply letter which enclosed the signed contract forms (Exhibit 4- P), one 
rationally must come to the conclusion that at that time DeEry must have 
known of the conditional nature of the "contract". He states therein: 
I am now printing the solicitation material for the 
student flights, which I will send to you in the next few 
days as well as the first draft of the ITC filing. 
I did not file earlier because I did not want to make 
this exciting new concept public until the time was 
right. [Emphasis added] 
- ll-
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Thus, DeEry knew of the conditions in the contract, needed no ot:; 
information to make a first draft of the ITC fJ.ing, and only waited beca~:' 
of his own preference. Further, it appears in that same letter that he :1,, 
not at that time begun any type of solicitation. Capitol believes this goes 
to show the tentative nature of the so- called "contract" and the concerr.s 
of the respective parties. 
Following this, on December 5, 1973, Capitol sent to DeEry an 
addendum for all charter commitments, raising the price due to th2 o1l 
embargo, and for which it was necessary to return to Capitol within two 
weeks or all flights were cancelled. (Exhibit 5- P). DeEry filled out me 
addendum for all other flights it had scheduled, but left out Flight 485, 
the one this lawsuit is based on. The obvious inference from this, prope: 
drawn by Capitol, was that DeEry no longer desired these flights. Capit: 
contends this again displays DeEry's wavering intent to make a formal 
"contract". 
DeEry contends that it requested information from Capitol that 
was never supplied which was necessary for the ITC filing on Flight 48.;, 
(Tr. Day 2, p. 3). The correspondence on January 4, 1974, (Exhibit 9-f' 
can only be characterized as less than crystal clear. -~ttached therein 
were sample copies of promotional literature and a request for forms 
and instructions for an ITC filing. G'o reference was r.1ade to the fligtts 
for which this was necessary. Capitol was not in the practice of 
ITC filing forms to DeEry, and DeEry had earlier sta~ed it would se:c, 
first draft of the ITC fili.'1g for Flighc 435 co Capitol wnh the o•·l -~ 
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:naterials. Now DeBry complains that since Capitol did not send forms, 
it could not file. This can in no way be characterized as a prever.tion of 
performance by Capitol. DeBry was certainly capable of obtaining that 
information from the CAB itself. 
On January 29, 1974, DeBry wrote to Capitol and exhibited a possible 
change of intent with regard to Charter Flight No. 485. (Exhibit 11-P). 
Of course, by this time DeBry had instituted lawsuits against Capitol on 
other matters, and Capitol was reluctant to comply with his "reasonable 
requests". DeBry made several other inquiries with regard to this, all 
evidencing the fact of the tentative nature of the arrangement thus far and 
his own anxiety in firming up the plans. (Tr. Day 2, p. 9 and 11). 
In further exhibition of his uncertainty, DeBry resorted to a 
declaratory action in July of 1974, which was unsuccessful, but resulted 
in 1he present action. (Tr. Day 2, p. 18). Even though claiming there 
was a contract, DeBry requested a return of his deposit for Flight No. 
485 on May 1, 1974. (Exhibit 14-P). At that point it seems clear that 
anyone capable of digesting this complicated set of facts, would realize 
there was no contract. The consideration for the so-called "contract" 
was very tentative in nature at best and now being withdrawn, there could 
be no contract between the parties. 
In addition to all of this, DeBry admits that the departure gate for 
Flight No. 485 was tentative. Accordingly, the price of the charter flight 
·'OIUd change substantially, and the flight may not even meet his demand 
:ntd '>-et, UeBry contends there was a contract. (Tr. Day 3, p. 63). 
-13-
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Most of that evidence presented herein was given by DeEry hiD.s: __ ' 
at trial. The information testified to by Buck Mansfield only strengthens 
the conclusion that the nature of their relationship was very tentative a": 
there was no intent on the part of Capitol or DeEry to be bound absolute>. 
by sending to DeEry an unsigned, incomplete contract form. Cpon that 
evidence, the trial judge should have granted Capitol's motion for a 
directed verdict as a matter of law, the evidence clearly showing that be 
intent of the parties did not give rise to a contract. 
In a recent Utah case, a similar question arose concerning wher. 
a written contract becomes binding upon a party. In Aspen Acres 
Association v. Seven Associates, 29 Utah 2d 303, 408 F. 2d 1179 (19731,: 
plaintiff attempted to enforce a written contract with the defendant whtch 
required the defendant to convey easements to the plaintiff. The evidence 
adduced at trial indicated that the contract was signed by the represernL 
of the parties but never delivered to plaintiff by defendant. In holding the 
the contract was not binding, even though signed by both parties, this 
court stated: 
... The mere affi.xing of the signatures to the contract 
did not conclusively prove that there was a binding 
contract. In addition, there must be a delivery, not 
in the traditional sense of the manual transfer ~ 
the sense that it was the intent of the parties to have 
the document become legally operative at some 
definite point in time, however, such intent might be 
indicated. 29 Utah 2d at 311. 
_-\gain, in reviewing the facts, the court must keep in mtnd t;ca; 
both of the parties involved were faoiliar w:th the Cc\B regdatwrs 
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govern this transaction. The court must asswne that the parties intended 
to act in accordance with these regulations which concern the contracts 
in question. 
Pursuant to the above, Capitol requests that this court reverse 
the decision below and order a directed verdict in favor of Capitol. There 
is no mistaking that the intent of the parties was not sufficient to give rise 
to a contract. 
POINT II. 
DEERY BREACHED THE CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THE 
CONTRACT FORl\II, THEREBY EXCUSING ANY PERFORiviANCE 
BY CAPITOL. 
Asswning the court overcomes the enormous hurdles set forth in 
Point I and finds a contract, the question must still be asked whether 
performance may be required of a party to a contract where the demanding 
party has not performed essential conditions to that contract. As set forth 
in Point I, the contract was conditioned upon DeEry qualifying under the 
CAB regulations, and this was not done. 
Before liability can arise upon a promise qualified by express 
conditions, the conditions must be fulfilled. See 17 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Contracts, Section 3 61. Therefore, if DeEry failed to provide the 
requested docwnents, Capitol would be relieved from the obligations 
'lnder the contract to perform. See Restatement of Contracts, Section 
l3o, and also Ross v. Harding, 64 vVash. 2d 231, 391 P. 2d 526 (1964). 
it is not sufficient for the defaulting party to say that the condition will 
'<•crk a hardship upon him. In Ephraim Theater v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 
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321 P. 2d 221 (1958), this court declared that neither the courts nor :he 
parties can ignore or modify the conditions expressed in a contract mere; 
because it will work a hardship upon a party. Again, the North Demer 
Bank case, Supra, would be relevant, wherein it was stated: 
Failure to fulfill any one of the conditions would have 
been sufficient grounds for Capital Federal's refusal 
to make the loan. 528 P.2d at 414. 
In reviewing the contract it will be seen that the reverse side 
contains various requirements labeled as conditions. When viewed in 
light of the CAB regulations, it is easy to see why there was concern 
on the part of Buck Mansfield about the sales materials and the proposed 
prospectus for filing. Mansfield was obviously concerned about this, 
and DeBry, as set out in Point I, was obviously aware and understood 
these regulations. DeBry did not comply with the regulations or the 
conditions of the contract even if a contract arose at the time DeEry sign: 
Capitol is, therefore, excused from performance, and this court should 
reverse the decree below and order a directed verdict in favor of Capite:. 
POINT III. 
DEBRY FAILED TO PROPERLY MITIGATE DAMAGES AND, 
THEREFORE, IVLi\Y NOT RECOVER FOR ANY EXCESS 
EXPENSE HE MAY HAVE JNClJRRED IN ORDER TO CARRY 
OUT HIS TOUR. 
If the court finds a contract and finds that Capitol had a duty to 
fly Charter Flight No. 485, the question must still be answered whether 
one party can ignore an obvious rejection of the agreement and incur 
unreasonable expenses instead of looking !'or alternatives to perior:::"J~.' 
of the contract. 
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The fundamental "rule of avoidable consequences'' imposes the 
duty to minimize damages on the aggrieved party to a breached contract. 
25 CJS, Damages, Section 32 at 697. Utah follows the rule that a"plaintiff 
has a duty reasonably to mitigate damages". Thompson v. Jacobsen, 23 
Utah 2d 359, 463 P. 2d 801, 802 (1970). Utah has further held that a "seller 
must minimize or keep down his damages so far as it is reasonably within 
his power to do so." Nasner v. Burton, 2 Utah 2d 236, 272 P. 2d 163, 166 
(1954). Utah, consequently, permits a plaintiff to recover "only such damages 
as he could not, with reasonable effort, have avoided". Jankele v. Texas 
Company, 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425 (1936). The general rule, therefore, 
is to forbid recovery for he resultant excess damages. See also Sheffet 
v. Los Angeles County, 84 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Cal. App. 1970); Hunter v. 
Croysdill, 169 Cal. App. 2d 307, 337 P. 2d 174 (1959); Murphy v. Kelly, 
137 Cal. App. 2d 21, 289 P. 2d 565 (1955). 
The long established principles cited above were summarized in 
Winans v. Sierra Lumber Company, 66 Cal. 61, 4 P. 952 (1884): 
The law imposes upon everyone engaged in the performance 
of a contract the duty of doing everything in his power to 
prevent loss to himself from a breach of the contract 
by the other party. If he cannot prevent it altogether, 
he must make reasonable exertions to render it as light 
as possible; and if, by his own negligence or wilfulness 
he allows the damages to be unncessarily enhanced, 
the increased loss must fall on him. [Emphasis added] 
This language draws heavily on the treatise, Sutherland on Damages 
13ct Ed.), Yolume 1, Section 88. Sutherland's language is approvingly 
quoted in :Vlolrb v. Stewart, 147 Cal. 413, 81 P. 1073 (1905). 
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It is, the ref ore, required that as soon as the aggrieved party lee;:, 
that the other party has stopped performance of an executory contract, 
that party "cannot continue to perform and recover damages based on 
full performance." Schmidt v. New Plastic Corporation, 144 Cal. .-'l.pp. 
2d Supp. 849, 301 P. 2d 131 (1956). Thus: 
The rule is well settled that it is the duty of one 
who knows he is threatened with damages to do all 
he reasonably can do to minimize his damage. 
California Cotton Cooperative Association v. Byrne, 58 Cal. App. 
2d 340, 345, 136 P. 2d 359 (1943). 
Utah follows this rule: As soon as one party realizes that the ot~e: 
party will not perform a contractual condition, the aggrieved party need 1 
not "uselessly abide time" but ought, under appropriate circumstances, •:' 
mitigate its damages. University Club v. Invesco Holding Company, 29 
Utah 21, 504 P. 2d 29, 30 (1972). Here DeEry unreasonably stood by ano 
idly watched its claimed damages escalate long after it became obvious 
that Flight 485 was not going to be operated by Capitol. 
Many months previous to the day of departure, DeEry should 
certainly have known that there were problems with the contract and that 
he should make efforts to mitigate the possible damages. As early as 
May of 1974, DeEry revoked his previous instructions regarding the 
$1, 000. 00 deposit and must have known at that time that such an action 
removed the consideration for the contract. ~lr. DeEry, the chair:nar 
of the board of DeEry Hilton Company, was a:1 attorney and was respc.'' 
for carrying out fuese negotianons and, thereiore, should be 11eld •c," 
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higher standard than those persons knowing very little about the law. He 
knew that Capitol had not responded to inquiries about the contract and his 
frequent inquiries certainly are a signal that he was distressed about the 
status and recognized that there were real problems. Also, DeEry failed 
to comply with the conditions of the contract, and the law should presume 
that a party to a contract should know whether or not it is in compliance 
with the terms of that contract. Although DeEry claims that it needed 
information from Capitol to make an ITC filing, when DeEry later attempted 
to make other arrangements for the flights, DeEry was able to submit a 
complete tour prospectus to Pan American Airlines on very little notice. 
(Tr. Day 2, p. 61). 
In July of 1974, DeEry instituted a declaratory action against 
Capitol expressing at that time the fear that Capitol was not going to 
honor the contract. That resulted in the instant litigation, but DeEry at 
that time should have known that Capitol was not going to perform. Clearly, 
if the parties were at that point coming to blows in a courtroom, that 
constitutes reasonable notice to each that a contract dispute has arisen. 
At that point DeEry had an absolute duty to mitigate his damages. 
Although DeEry claims that in July he made a list of air carriers 
and submitted this list to his secretary to find an alternate carrier, no 
list was produced in court, and his secretary was not produced to verify 
his statement. (Tr. Day 2, p. 58). The only airli.'1e contacted by written 
communication from DeEry was Pan Am on November 2. Indeed, 
2.ck:Jowledging the fact that the carrier and the tour operator must make a 
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joint ITC filing, the documentation attached to the letter to Pan Am con," 
(1) a prospectus; (2) a surety bond; (3) the filing fee; (4) the charter agr:c 
ment; (5) the sample solicitation material. All of this DeEry claims to:"" 
been unable to do for Capitol. (Tr. Day 2, p. 61). In other words, DeB: 
did nothing to find alternative air carrier service until it was much too:, 
and then submitted to the potential air carrier all of the information that 
was required by Capitol to comply with the terms of its contract. 
In addition, no solicitation for actual sale began for the flight um;" 
September of 1974. Until that time, DeEry did not know whether there 
would actually be a flight or not. (Tr. Day 2, p. 46 and 47). The way 
I 
DeEry's operation typically worked, a flight would be chartered, market::. 
of tickets would then be attempted, and if insufficient sales resulted, the 
flight would be cancelled. Capitol believes the obvious inference from aL 
of this is that DeEry did not know whether he would actually need another 
flight and, therefore, did not attempt to contact ot.'"ler air carriers. Had 
DeEry acted reasonably, it would have known that Capitol would not 
provide the air service and that the best way to mitigate its damages at 
that point was to either cancel the tour altogether or find alternative me<.:o 
for providing air service. 
It is interesting to note that DeEry claims to have been unable to 
find other air carrier service when with little effort Capitol was able t2 
find air carrier service available up until the first week iil October of 
1974, with Saturn Airways at a much more reasonable price than t.'1at 
paid by DeEry. (Tr. Day,!, p. 11)" -~lso, :\lr. Ralph Sacks, a repr:s~ 
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of Saturn, testified to the fact that the period of time which DeEry was 
requesting air service was actually a slack period and there would likely have 
been other air carriers open to provide service on the dates needed. (Tr. 
Day 4, p. 4). The resulting difference between the price of air service 
by Capitol and that which could have been provided by Saturn was the amount 
of the JUry verdict in the instant case, $8, 170. 00. Capitol contends that 
even this verdict was excessive. 
As discussed above, DeEry should have known that performance 
of the contract was not likely under the circumstances. This knowledge 
occurred many months before actual breach of the contract, therefore 
allowing DeEry ample time to mitigate its damages. DeEry did not make 
a reasonable effort to mitigate damages and, in fact, made very little 
effort at all. The obvious reason for this lack of effort was the fact that 
it was uncertain until the latter part of September of 1974, whether or not 
a flight would even be needed. Because of this method of operation, DeEry 
was unable to mitigate its damages and now asks the court to compel 
Capitol to pay for these errors in judgment. Also, DeEry failed to respond 
to the conditions of the contract but regardless of this, wants someone 
else to pay for this mistake. 
Capitol asks this court to reverse the damage award of the court 
below and order judgment in favor of Capitol 
POINT IV. 
NO _--\TTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED. 
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DeEry correctly cites the "American Rule" that a prevailing pw· i 
is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees except where permitted by 
contract or by statute. Capitol agrees with the conclusion in the case o: 
Alyeska Pipe Line Service Co. v. Wilderness Societv, 421 G. S. 240, "; 
L. Ed. 2d 141, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975\ as cited by DeEry. However, DeBr. 
has misconstrued the use of the "bad faith'' exception in allowing attorne: .. 
fees. In examining DeEry's own cited authorities, in the case of~ 
Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 186 F. 2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951), there was ar. 
action brought by Negro locomotive firemen against their employer and 
their collective bargaining agent. The suit was brought for discri...'llinato~ 
conduct. The court sustained the taxation of attorney's fees in favor of 
the prevailing party in this case, first because it was a suit in equity ar.c 
1 
within that original criteria, and second,· the plaintiffs were subjected to 
"discriminatory and oppressive conduct by a powerful labor organizatior. , 
which was required, as bargaining agent, to protect their individual 
interests." 186 F. 2d at 481. The court cited therein authority supportr: 
the power of equity to award attorney's fees. Obviously, this is not a 
suit in equity. 
The case of Rainev v. Jackson State College, 481 F. 2d 347 (5th C 
1973), again illustrates an unusual situation where attorney's fees could 
be awarded in which it was totally unllke the instant case. Raine,Y was' 
civil rights action arising out of an employment contract and the courc: 
sustained a partial award of attorney's fees due to the fact that de:er.LC 
openly violated a previous court order. The standards set :·orth tl;erc 
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was that in carrying out the litigation, defendants must be "unreasonable 
and obdurately obstinate". Similarly, the case of Monroe v. Board of 
Commissioners of the City of Jackson, Tennessee, 453 F. 2d 259 (6th 
Cir. 1972), was a civil rights suit under a school desegregation plan. 
Again, defendants were guilty at one point of violating a clear court 
mandate. The court allowed award of attorney's fees for litigation arising 
from that act. Attorney's fees were not allowed for the entire litigation, 
however, due to the fact that it was normal litigation and defendant was 
not guilty of unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy. Also, the court was 
obliged to follow the determination of the district court. They stated: 
As noted in the Bradley case, the question of whether 
the defendant has been guilty of unreasonable, obdurate 
ob::tinacy is for the district judge to determine. He has 
a wide discretion in this regard, ... 453 F. 2d at 
2 63. 
It may be true that "a common carrier has a duty to carry all 
passengers upon reasonable request" but this duty does not run in 
contravention of the regulations promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics 
Board. It cannot be contended that the common law doctrine surrounding 
common carriers would require Capitol to provide air carrier service 
to DeEry in violation of the CAB regulations. Exhaustive treatment of 
DeEry's inappropriate conduct and Capitol's refusal to provide the 
service has been given herein and the discussion need not be prolonged 
at this point. 
DeEry contends that Capitol unfairly prolonged and delayed the 
--1Stant lit 1 gation. It was DeEry's contention that Capitol was a common 
-2 3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
carrier and Capitol denied this status. DeEry contends that this was ar. 
unreasonable contention but this may be answered simply by referring 
to the trial transcript. During argument to the court on this point and 
others, the court stated: 
You are both very persuasive. lam going to give the 
matter consideration and we will go on with the evidence 
this afternoon. (Tr. Day 3, p. 47) 
Obviously the lower court did not feel there was no reasonable basis 
for this theory, and, in fact, the theory contended for by DeEry was 
not stipulated to. Capitol stipulated that it was a "common carrier with 
the framework of the Civil Aeronautics Board's regulations ... " (Tr. 
Day 3, p. 47). There was no stipulation of common carrier status unde 
common law and counsel entered into the stipulation solely for the purpc 
of simplification of that issue due to the fact that common carrier statuo 
under the CAB regulations would not change any of the liabilities of 
Capitol. To deny the good faith of counsel without more substantial corr 
plaints than this would be to incorrectly apply the law. 
DeEry contends that Capitol's in-house counsel, Mr. Topharn 
purposefully deceived or attempted to deceive DeEry. However, this w 
explained by Mr. Mansfield at trial where he told the court that he infor 
Mr. Topham that contracts had been sent to Topham's office and that 
Topham's inability to find the contract forms could have been due to 
sloppy housekeeping. (Tr. Day 3, pp. 17 through 19). Clearly, tho.l 
contention was not met by DeEry's ev1dence and there is nu reason 
doubt Mr. Mansfield's credibility. 
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Again, this is not a case in equity but a contract case regarding 
damages and the general rule does not allow attorney's fees. The "bad 
faith" cited by DeEry is little more than run of the mill litigation. If 
one wishes to discuss bad faith of one of the parties, one need only 
consider the fact that this is the third lawsuit instituted by DeEry against 
Capitol and the only one in which DeEry was successful. (Tr. Day 2, 
p. 19). One of those actions was filed in the Federal District Court 
and another was tried in the Third District Court of Utah and heard by 
the Utah Supreme Court. Both of these cases were decided against 
DeEry. When the facts of this litigation were brought up at trial, DeEry 
continually denied that the decisions in these cases went against him. 
(Tr. Day 2, p. 2 0, 21). A more clear example of bad faith would be 
difficult to imagine by the court. However, even this may not arise to 
the level of bad faith required for an award of attorney's fees. 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court with 
regard to the award of attorney's fees should stand .. This is a matter 
which is within the discretion of the trial judge and no compelling reasons 
for the award can be cited in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Capitol is controlled extensively by the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, and, therefore, all contracts entered into by Capitol with tour 
operators are with knowledge of the regulations and requirements of 
·d:e CAB. 
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2. DeEry is an experienced tour operator and must be presumec 
to have knowledge and understanding of the CAB regulations and require-
ments, and, therefore, enters into contracts with air carriers with that 
knowledge. It was understood by both parties that compliance with C1B 
regulations was necessary to have a binding contract. 
3. The evidence clearly sets out that the parties on both sides 
considered the contract forms to be a tentative agreement subJect to 
modification by both parties and subJect to compliance with the conditic:;; 
of the contract itself. The circumstances show the intent of the parties 
to be less than that required for a contract. For the foregoing reasons 
Capitol requests that this court reverse the decree below and order a 
decree in favor of Capitol, finding that there was no contract. 
4. If this court finds a contract, it must also find from the 
circumstances that DeEry breached the conditions of that contract, there: 
excusing Capitol from performance. Therefore, Capitol requests that t:. 
court reverse the decree below and order a decree in favor of Capitol, 
finding that there was no duty on the part of Capitol to perform. 
5. If this court finds that Capitol had a duty to perform ur.der 
the contract and breached that duty, it should also find that by failing to 
act until it was effectively too late, De Bry failed in mitigating its damagt 
Had DeEry acted when a reasonable man would be expected to do so, rhC 
may have been no damages, and in any case, no more than the maxine:-· 
as decided upon by the JUry below. Therefore, Capitol requests thts 'c 
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to modify the damage decree below to reflect the fact that DeEry failed 
in his responsibility. Thus, no damages should be awarded. Otherwi.se, 
the decree should not be disturbed. 
Respectfully submitted this ___ day of October, 1977. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By _____________________________ ___ 
PHILIP R. FISHLER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent 
were served upon the Plaintiff-Appellant by mailing the same, postage 
prepaid, to Clark W. Sessions, Watkiss & Campbell, Twelfth Floor, 
310 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 this ___ day of 
October, 1977. 
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